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Recovery of Commissions by Unlicensed
Real Estate Brokers
I. Introduction
Real estate brokerage is a licensed profession in every state.'
The first regulatory2 licensing act was passed in Oregon in 1919,3
initiating a legislative trend that climaxed in 1959 when New Hamp-
shire and Rhode Island became the last states to enact such legisla-
tion.4 The impetus for these statutes was the prevailing conditions in
most states5 that allowed a broker to obtain a license by merely filing
an application and paying a small fee. 6 A plethora of "reprehensible
people"7 had filled the ranks of the profession, bringing with them
an assortment of sharp practices to victimize a helpless public.' The
licensing acts were intended to remedy this situation by testing a
broker's competence through examinations9 and subjecting his ethics
,to scrutiny.1"
1. A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE
50 (1971).
2. If the licensing statute is intended only to raise revenue and not to regulate
the profession, contracts made in violation of the statute generally will be enforce-
able. Tyrone v. Kelley, 9 Cal. 3d 1, 507 P.2d 65, 106 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1973); State
Real Estate Comm. v. O'Data, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 286, 274 A.2d 232 (1971);
Newhouse v. Dipner, 118 Pa. Super. 101, 180 A. 88 (1935). The revenue raising-
regulatory distinction is not an ultimate test, however; it is merely a means of deter-
mining legislative intent regarding enforceability of contracts made in violation of the
statute. Miller v. Ammon, 145 U.S. 421 (1891); Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v. 40th &
3d Corp., 19 N.Y.2d 354, 227 N.E.2d 30, 280 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1967).
3. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 696.010-.990 (1974).
4. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 331-A:1, 331-A:8a (1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 5-20.5-1, 5-20.5-22 (Supp. 1975).
5. Amdur, The Real Estate License Act-Synopsis, Elaboration and Com-
ments, 12 S. TEx. L.J. 269 (1971-72).
6. Id.
7. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1922, § IX, at 1, col. 1.
8. See generally R. SEMENOW, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN REAL ESTATE
(1972).
9. E.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.798 (1975); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 441(e)
(McKinney Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. § 452.05(2) (1974).
10. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-9 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw
§ 441(e) (McKinney Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 437 (1968). The
states' authority to regulate real estate brokers and other professions in this man-
ner arises from their police power. Zerlin v. Louisiana Real Estate Bd., 158 La. 111,
103 So. 528 (1925); Shalov v. Rosovsky, 136 Misc. 132, 239 N.Y.S. 54 (2d Dep't
1929); McKinley v. Commonwealth, State Bd. of Funeral Directors, 11 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 241, 313 A.2d 180 (1973); Massie v. Dudley, 173 Va. 42, 3 S.E.2d 176
(1939); Hilboldt v. Wisconsin Real Estate Brokers' Bd., 28 Wis. 2d 474, 137 N.W.2d




As a result of the licensing statutes, however, a client perfectly
satisfied with a broker's services may be able to avoid paying a
commission if the broker was unlicensed." This comment will ex-
plore and analyze problems faced by the unlicensed broker when he is
forced by a seller to resort to the courts to recover his commission.
The initial focus is on difficulties faced when the unlicensed broker
has worked alone on a transaction clearly within the scope of the
statutes. The remainder of the comment deals with cases in which
the broker's rights are interdependent with the rights of someone
else, with conflicts of laws problems peculiar to brokerage transac-
tions, and with hybrid transactions involving both real and personal
property."2
II. When the Broker Is Unlicensed
A. General Rule
Modem statutes requiring real estate brokers to be licensed are
clearly regulatory in nature.'1 In addition to testing the broker's
competence by requiring him to pass an examination, 14 they also
police power, the statute must tend to protect the health, safety, and property of the
citizens of the state. Howard v. Lebby, 197 Ky. 324, 246 S.W. 828 (1923).
The constitutionality of the licensing acts has been challenged as discriminatory
and as a deprivation of the right to engage in real estate brokerage. One such case
in which the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's statute was upheld is Young v. De-
partment of Pub. Instr., 105 Pa. Super. 153, 160 A. 151 (1932). The statute had
been attacked as discriminatory because attorneys were exempt from its provisions.
The court declared,
Our Supreme Court has many times sustained classification as the proper
exercise of legislative power, and held that it is a legislative question with
which the courts will not interfere, if made in good faith and based on genu-
ine and substantial distinctions of the subjects classified . . . . What busi-
ness or occupation so far affects the public welfare and good order as to
require it to be licensed is a matter of legislative consideration and control
which, when exercised in good faith is outside the jurisdiction of the courts.
Id. at 157-58, 160 A. at 153; accord, Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v. 40th & 3rd Corp.,
19 N.Y.2d 354, 227 N.E.2d 30, 280 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1967).
11. See generally Annot., 118 A.L.R. 646 (1939).
12. The immediate effects of the statutes are difficult to determine since the
unorganized way in which the profession was operated and supervised made records
difficult to keep. New York passed its licensing act in 1926. On April 1, 1926,
29,000 people had brokers licenses in New York. Three years later there were
25,000. From 1926 until 1929, 7,500 people took the required exam and 2,200 failed
to pass, which indicates that at least 8,500 of the 29,000 licensed in 1926 would have
failed. The state official in charge of compiling these statistics stated, "It is clear,
therefore, that as a result of the educational qualifications required of applicants
since 1926, the number of incompetents in the real estate brokerage business has been
reduced from approximately 30% to about 10% in less than three years." N.Y.
Times, Oct. 20, 1929, § XII, at 2, col. 1.
13. See notes 2, 9-10 and accompanying text supra.
14. See note 9 supra.
authorize the licensing authorities to pass judgment upon his ethics,'5
a judgment later confirmed in some states when the broker seeks
bonding.' 6  The regulatory nature of these statutes is important.
Because they are police regulations intended to protect the public by
insuring the skill and integrity of brokers and agents, a broker who
has entered into an employment contract without a license cannot
recover his commission in court without establishing himself or the
transaction for which recovery is sought as an exception to the
statutory requirements.'"
The courts reason that when an unlicensed broker enters into an
employment contract, the contract is illegal.' A bargain is illegal if
its formation or performance is tortious, criminal, or otherwise op-
posed to public policy.'" The unlicensed broker is, therefore, at the
mercy of his client, who may decline to pay the commission even
though satisfied with the services rendered. If the broker sues for his
commission, the client can assert the illegal contract as an insuperable
defense. To prove that he earned the commission, the broker has to
establish that he acted without a license in violation of the licensing
statute. "A plaintiff cannot recover where his cause of action cannot
be established without showing that he has broken the law."' 0
B. "But I'm Not a Broker!": Attempts To Disclaim Brokerage and
A void Statutory Requirements
If a broker wants to establish himself or his business as an
exception to the license requirement, he must present
a clear case, free from all doubt, as such provision, being in
derogation of the primary purpose of the Real Estate Agents
and Brokers Law, must be strictly construed against the person
claiming the exemption and in favor of the public.
21
For example, the Pennsylvania statute defines real estate broker as
"all persons, copartnerships and corporations . . . who for another
and for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration . . .
15. See note 10 supra.
16. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.88.171 (1975); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 3.3-355.7(c)
(Supp. 1975).
17. E.g., Miller Nationwide Real Estate Corp. v. Sikeston Motel Corp., 418
S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1967); O'Boyle v. DuBose-Killeen Properties, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 273
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968). Compare note 63 and accompanying text infra with note
147 and accompanying text infra.
18. But cf. notes 69-70 and accompanying text infra.
19. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1373 (1962).
20. Farragut Baggage and Transfer Co. v. Shadron Realty, Inc., 18 Ariz. App.
197, 200, 501 P.2d 38, 41 (1972); Aval Corp. v. Bumb, 451 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir.
1971); Calhoun v. Banner, 254 N.Y. 325, 172 N.E. 523 (1930); Foley v. Hassey,
55 Wyo. 27, 95 P.2d 85 (1939).
21. Gilbert v. Edwards, 276 S.W.2d 611, 617 (Mo. App. 1955); Common-
wealth v. McKinley-Gregg Auto. Co., 345 Pa. 544, 28 A.2d 919 (1942).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 432 (1968) (emphasis added).
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act as real estate brokers." Therefore, if a broker argues that he is
not within the statutory prohibition because instead of a commission
he is to receive a set fee, a share of the profits, or any other unique
arrangement, he will be unsuccessful. 24  Every statute contains a
generalizing provision.23 A broker need not be licensed, however, if
he is acting gratuitously or on his own behalf.
26
Unlicensed brokers have made many unsuccessful attempts to
persuade the courts that they were mere finders or middlemen. A
middleman or finder is one who has no duty other than to bring the
parties together.27 A broker, on the other hand, takes an active role
in negotiations.2 If the court finds that the middleman or finder has
even the least authority to negotiate or that one of the parties expects
to obtain the benefit of his judgment, he will be vested with the
fiduciary duties of a broker and the concomitant responsibilities.29
The licensing statutes define brokers as those who negotiate real
estate transactions.30 These provisions appear applicable only when
a broker has actually engaged in negotiations. They have been
liberally construed, however, to keep unlicensed brokers out of the
courts. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, for example, has said
that to give the word "negotiate" a strict construction would exclude
from the statute's regulatory purposes a great percentage of brokers
who normally do nothing more than acquaint prospective buyers and
sellers with the price and location of available property.31 In Corson
v. Keane,32 a New Jersey case, a meeting was arranged by an unli-
censed broker so that two parties could negotiate a $50,000 loan to
be secured by a mortgage. The court denied recovery. Even though
23. See note 29 and accompanying text inf ra.
24. E.g., Solomon v. Goldberg, 1I N.J. Super. 69, 78 A.2d 118 (1950); Meitner
v. State Real Estate Comm., 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 426, 275 A.2d 417 (1971).
25. E.g., DE.. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2901 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, §
212 (Supp. 1975).
26. Williams v. Kinsey, 74 Cal. App. 2d 583, 169 P.2d 487 (1946); Shorewood,
Inc. v. Standring, 19 Wash. 2d 627, 144 P.2d 243 (1943). But cf. State Real Estate
Comm. v. Tice, 200 Pa. Super. 553, 190 A.2d 188 (1963), in which dishonesty and
incompetence in selling his own property were grounds for revoking a broker's li-
cense.
27. McConnell v. Cowan, 44 Cal. 2d 805, 285 P.2d 261 (1955).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 432(a) (1968) (emphasis added) defines a real
estate broker, in part, as one who "shall negotiate the sale, exchange" of real estate.
See Wis. STAT. § 452.01(2) (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-730 (1974). Various
real estate transactions are covered and often described by these statutes.
31. Harrison v. Soffer, 221 Pa. Super. 273, 289 A.2d 752 (1972).
32. 4 N.J. 221, 72 A.2d 314 (1950).
the broker had not been present at the negotiations, the court rea-
soned that negotiating within the meaning of the statute merely meant
bringing the parties together in a negotiating frame of mind. This
possibly overbroad interpretation was justified by the court as neces-
sary to give effect to the statute. These holdings, which are based
solely on public policy considerations, ignore legitimate distinctions
between a broker and a mere finder."3 Furthermore, they conflict
with the rule of statutory interpretation that penal statutes are to be
strictly construed.1
4
C. Engaging in a Single, Isolated Transaction
Most states will not allow an unlicensed broker to recover a
commission on the ground that the transaction for which he is seeking
recovery was the only one in which he ever engaged. Pennsylvania's
statute, for example, states that "one act in consideration of compen-
sation . . . shall constitute prima facie evidence that the person
• .. so acting or attempting to act, is a real estate broker within the
meaning of this act."3" Tanenbaum v. Sylvan Builders6 involved an
unlicensed nonbroker who brought an action for tortious interference
with prospective contract. The New Jersey statute states that "no
person shall engage either directly or indirectly in the business of a
real estate broker or salesman, temporarily or otherwise . . .. '
Another section states that "[a]ny single act, transaction or sale
shall constitute engaging in the business within the meaning of this
article."3 8 In denying recovery the court noted that the legislature's
manifest intention was to close the courts to unlicensed real estate
brokers. This policy was considered strong enough to counter the
competing prohibition against tortious interference with another's
prospective contractual advantage. Thus, the transaction's isolated
nature would not allow pecuniary recovery through circumvention of
the statute."
In Owens v. Capri4 ° plaintiff, a nonbroker, invested a substantial
amount of his own money to find a purchaser for defendant's ranch.
He hoped to recover his expenditures through his commission. Al-
though recovery was denied because the statute forbade isolated
33. See notes 86-87 and accompanying text intra.
34. Frier v. Terry, 230 Ark. 302, 323 S.W.2d 415 (1959); Bamford v. Cope,
31 Colo. App. 161, 499 P.2d 639 (1972); Manor Homes, Inc. v. Sava, 73 Misc. 2d
660, 342 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Civ. Ct. Queens 1973); State Real Estate Comm. v. O'Data,
1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 286, 274 A.2d 232 (1971).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 432(a) (1968); cf. Smukler v. Rogers Realty Co.,
346 Pa. 522, 31 A.2d 144 (1943).
36. 29 N.J. 63, 148 A.2d 176 (1959).
37. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-1 (1963) (emphasis added).
38. Id. § 45:15-2.
39. Accord, O'Boyle v. DuBose-Kifleen Properties, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1968).
40. 65 Wyo. 325, 202 P.2d 174 (1949).
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transactions, the court seemed to balk at applying the statute. It
recognized the substantial hardship to plaintiff, who had engaged in
only that one transaotion.4'
Only one jurisdiction will allow recovery when the plaintiff is not
a professional broker. The Virgin Islands Code42 limits the licensing
requirement to those "engaging in the business"4 3 without mentioning
the phrase "isolated transactions." The Third Circuit applied Virgin
Islands law in Roberts v. Ross41 and allowed recovery because "the
party did not hold himself out as a broker. '45  This minority position,
in view of the unusually narrow statute upon which it was based, is an
aberration in the law. 46  Nevertheless, much can be said for it.
Applying licensing requirements to a nonbroker who has performed
only an isolated transaction is a penalty disproportionate to the of-
fense. An early Pennsylvania decision adopted this view, stating that
it could not imagine a nonbroker being denied a commission because
he was unlicensed if he had performed to the satisfaction of his prin-
cipal.47 Yet, modem law as illustrated by Owens denies recovery to a
nonbroker who on one occasion negotiates the sale of real estate even
though he loses substantial out-of-pocket expenses in search of a
buyer.4" The avowed purpose of the licensing acts is to protect the
public from dishonest and incompetent brokers. 49  A nonbroker
whose services are solicited for a single transaction, frequently by a
relative or friend, therefore, does not fall within the penumbra of the
perceived danger.50
A suggested alternative if the seller refuses to pay a commission
to the unlicensed broker is to force the seller to plead and prove that
41. Accord, Sherman v. Welsh, 87 Pa. Super. 282 (1926); cf. Parish v. Werner,
51 Pa. D. & C. 165 (C.P. Berks 1944), in which an unlicensed animal broker was
denied recovery under a statute similar to the one applicable to real estate brokers
except that it lacked a provision against isolated transactions. The court held that
this provision was unnecessary and would be implied.
Some older cases predating the modem regulatory statutes allowed recovery for
isolated transactions. E.g., Young v. Kidder, 33 N.M. 654, 275 P. 98 (1929); Woods
v. Heron, 229 Pa. 625, 78 A. 1128 (1911).
42. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 27, §§ 301, 303(IV)(e) (1957).
43. Id. § 301.
44. 344 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1965).
45. Downing v. Marks, 318 Pa. 289, 292, 178 A. 676, 677 (1935); Black v.
Snook, 204 Pa. 119, 53 A. 648 (1902); Woods v. Heron, 229 Pa. Super. 625, 78
A. 1128 (1911).
46. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
47. Coles v. Meade, 5 Pa. Super. 334 (1897).
48. 65 Wyo. 325, 202 P.2d 174 (1949); see note 44 and accompanying text
supra. Owens concerned an agreed compensation of $500.
49. See notes 1-10 and accompanying text supra.
50. See note 47 and accompanying text supra. The unlicensed broker in this
the plaintiff-broker was unlicensed. The plaintiff-broker then would
bear the burden of proving that it was an isolated transaction and that
he had performed with all the skill and care of a licensed broker.
After proving this he would recover his commission with the proviso
that the courts will be forever closed to him if he should again seek
their aid in recovering a commission for services performed without a
license. This policy avoids the injustice of forcing the nonbroker to
forfeit a commission to the unjust enrichment of another and excludes
from the courts those who habitually disregard the licensing statutes,
the proper targets of the statutory prohibitions. 5'
D. Assignment of Commissions by and to Unlicensed Brokers
If a broker assigns his right to a commission, the assignee's right
to recover depends on whether the assignor-broker could have en-
forced the original contract. Since the obligor can assert against the
assignee any defenses he could have asserted against the assignor, 2
the assignee will be denied recovery if the broker was unlicensed. If,
however, the original contract was made by a licensed broker who
assigned his commission, even to an unlicensed broker, recovery will
be allowed because the original contract was not illegal.5"
In Del Rey Realty Co. v. Fourl,54 for example, an unlicensed
broker performed services and received partial payment from defend-
ant. Then, to satisfy a debt, the broker assigned his rights under the
contract to plaintiff, a licensed brokerage company. Defendant re-
fused to pay the balance of the commission and counterclaimed for
rescission and restoration of payments already made. Both parties
were denied recovery. The court pointed out that plaintiff was
attempting to enforce an obligation arising from an illegal agreement.
Defendant was denied recovery because parties to an illegal contract
will be left where they stand.55
E. Expiration of Brokers' Licenses and Other Changes in Status
Brokerage licenses must be renewed periodically. 56 The broker
situation also may be subject to criminal sanctions. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 442(a)
(1968). The wisdom of subjecting a broker to criminal penalties when he already
has been compelled to forfeit a commission was attacked in Manker v. Tough, 79
Kan. 96, 98 P. 792 (1908).
51. See notes 1-10 and accompanying text supra.
52. Jones v. Martin, 41 Cal. 2d 23, 256 P.2d 905 (1953).
53. Frieman v. Greaves, 80 Ohio App. 341, 74 N.E.2d 860 (1947).
54. 44 Cal. App. 2d 399, 112 P.2d 649 (1941).
55. Accord, Walker v. Meyer, 167 La. 218, 119 So. 26 (1928). The better
view is to allow the seller to invoke the doctrine of pari delicto as long as he did
not consciously hire a broker known to be unlicensed with an intent to exploit him
by avoiding the commission. See generally Janzen v. Crum, 50 N.D. 544, 197 N.W.
138 (1924); Goodwin v. State ex rel. Crandall, 168 Okla. 4, 31 P.2d 841 (1934);
Walker v. Oakley, 347 Pa. 405, 32 A.2d 563 (1943).
56. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-319 (1969); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.798
(1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 438(3) (1968).
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whose license has expired or been revoked or who becomes licensed
after procuring a buyer may be in no better position than the broker
who never had and never will have a license.17 Most states require
the broker to plead and prove that he was licensed when he per-
formed or when his cause of action arose.58 This provision elimi-
nates frustration of the statutes' purpose-keeping unlicensed brokers
out of the courts-by defendants who negligently waive the lack-of-
licensure defense by failing to assert it.59
Recovery generally will be allowed if the broker was licensed at
the time he performed the services for which compensation is
sought. 60 Thus, a broker who obtains his license after signing a
contract but before rendering performance can recover his commis-
sion,6 notwithstanding the principle that when consideration for a
contract is a promise to perform an illegal act, the contract is void.6 2
Some courts explain their holdings by viewing the brokerage con-
tract as unilateral; the broker is not promising to do anything. 3
57. This would depend upon when the license expired.
58. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 446 (1968):
No action or suit shall be instituted, nor recovery therein be had, in
any court of this Commonwealth by any person . . . for compensation for
any act done or service rendered, the doing or rendering of which is pro-
hibited under the provisions of this act to others than licensed real estate
brokers, unless such person . . . was duly licensed . . . at the time of the
doing of such act or the rendering of such service.
In Schoenfeld v. Meckes, 57 Pa. D. & C. 531 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1946), the court in-
terpreted this provision as creating a condition precedent to recovery by the broker.
See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 4116 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-3
(1963).
If a licensing statute, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, §§ 311(l)-(20) (1958), does not
provide that the broker must plead and prove that he was licensed when he
performed the act for which he seeks compensation, it is the defendant's burden to
establish that the broker was unlicensed. Garber v. Yeend, 245 Ala. 510, 17 So. 2d
875 (1944).
The time between when the broker performed and when his cause of action arose
is insubstantial. The Oregon Supreme Court pointed this out in Hunter v. Cunning,
176 Ore. 250, 154 P.2d 562 (1944), when it said that the cause of action arose at
the time or throughout the period when the broker performed the services that culmi-
nated in the accrual of his cause of action. Lakeview Inv. Inc. v. Alamogordo Lake
Village, 86 N.M. 151, 520 P.2d 1096 (1974); Burns v. Gartzman, 139 Pa. Super. 453,
11 A.2d 708 (1940).
59. E.g., Albers v. Fitschen, 274 Minn. 375, 143 N.W.2d 841 (1966); Davis
v. Jouganatos, 81 Nev. 333, 402 P.2d 985 (1965). But cf. Cooper v. Johnston, 283
Ala. 565, 219 So. 2d 392 (1969).
60. Houston v. Williams, 53 Cal. App. 267, 200 P. 55 (1921); Geneva Inv.
Ltd. v. Trafalgar Devel. Ltd., 274 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
61. Cases cited note 60 supra.
62. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 598, 607 (1964).
63. See generally Baumgartner v. Meek, 126 Cal. App. 2d 505, 272 P.2d 552
(1954); Stone v. Hart, 7 Erie 135 (Pa. C.P. 1924), rev'd on other grounds, 82 Pa.
Super. 552 (1925).
Others treat the common law as modified by statutes requiring the
broker to be licensed when his cause of action arises. 64 The illegality
of the contract is suspended until performance, legal or illegal, is
rendered.65
Licensure at the time of performance is, therefore, crucial. A
broker who is licensed when he enters a contract will be denied
recovery of his commission if he lost his license before performance.0 6
Even though a broker's commission does not become due until later
when he has obtained a license, licensure during performance is
required.67 To allow recovery would defeat the intended effects of
the licensing requirement by permitting unlicensed brokers to conduct
business by deferring commissions until a license can be procured. 8
The courts usually hold that license is a condition precedent to the
lawful conducting of business. 9
The problem of a broker's obtaining his license while negotia-
tions are in progress, but before he has induced the buyer to accept
the seller's offer is illustrated by a New York case, Calhoun v.
Banner.70  The statute required the broker to plead and prove that he
was licensed when his cause of action arose,71 which he could do by
claiming a commission for only those services rendered after licen-
sure. The court allowed recovery for these services, stating that
"[n]o illegal act by the plaintiff was a producing cause of the results
achieved by the plaintiff for which he claims compensation or taints
with its own illegality the plaintiff's cause of action. '72
64. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
65. Id.
66. Stanson, Inc. v. McDonald, 147 Ohio St. 191, 70 N.E.2d 359 (1946).
67. Davis v. Chipman, 210 Cal. 609, 293 P. 40 (1930). See also Nelson v.
Stolz, 197 Ark. 1053, 127 S.W.2d 138 (1939); Bendell v. De Dominicis, 231 N.Y.
305, 167 N.E. 452 (1929); Burns v. Gartzman, 139 Pa. Super. 453, 11 A.2d 708
(1940).
68. Cases cited note 67 supra.
69. Recovery will be allowed if the broker's license expires after the rendition
of services but before the action is brought because he will have been licensed when
he performed the acts for which recovery is sought. Oro REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4735.21 (Baldwin 1974); Talley v. Tuggle, 183 Ark. 957, 39 S.W.2d 707 (1931);
Ohlendorf v. Shaw, 260 Md. 665, 273 A.2d 181 (1971).
70. 254 N.Y. 325, 172 N.E. 523 (1930).
71. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 442-d (McKinney 1968).
72. 254 N.Y. 325, 327, 172 N.E. 523, 524 (1930). But cf. Geneva Inv. Ltd.
v. Trafalgar Devel. Ltd., 274 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
Gillingham v. Cuthbert, 88 Pa. D. & C. 319 (C.P. Phila. 1954), is a Pennsyl-
vania case in which a broker was permitted to recover his commission despite viola-
tion of the license act. From 1937 to 1953 plaintiff-broker had complied with the
Pennsylvania law, but through an oversight he failed to complete his registration for
1953 before the March 1, 1953 deadline. He did, however, send in his fee on May
1, 1953, and had his registration dated May 5. On April 15, 1953, the broker had
arranged a contract of sale that was signed the same day. Defendant refused to pay
the commission and plaintiff brought an action in equity seeking to enjoin defendant
from conveying his property and from leaving the jurisdiction so that a constructive
trust could be impressed on the property. The court held for plaintiff, reasoning that
the statute's purpose was to protect the public by guaranteeing that brokers would
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III. Unlicensed Salesmen and Subagents
Real estate brokers frequently employ salesmen and subagents to
expand their sales territory. The Pennsylvania statute defines a real
estate salesman as a person employed by a broker who performs all
the functions of a broker.7" Salesmen who perform without licenses
are subject to the same penal sanctions as unlicensed brokers74 and
must meet similar licensing requirements. 75  Generally salesmen are
not empowered to act other than in the course of employment under
the auspices of a licensed broker.7 6 Some states also prohibit salesmen
from accepting compensation from anyone but the licensed brokers
for whom they work.77 They ordinarily are not included within
statutory provisions that require brokers to plead and prove licensure
at the time their cause of action arose as a condition precedent to
maintaining an action.7 s Instead the courts hold the unlicensed
salesman barred from recovery by statutory provisions that prohibit
the broker's compensation of unlicensed salesmen 79 and the sales-
be qualified through examinations. The court pointed out that after the initial exam
no more were required. Annual registration, thus, was merely a ministerial obliga-
tion whose neglect resulted not in suspension or revocation of the license, but simply
in expiration of the registration. Even if the court had decided that the broker had
been unlicensed, he would have been allowed to recover his commission. Equity, said
the court, would not tolerate use of a statute by a party within the class to be pro-
tected for an improper purpose. The broker had satisfied the purposes of the statute
by proving his competence over a period of many years. But see Gonnelli v. Mag-
azzu, 97 Pa. Super. 595 (1930).
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 432(b) (1968); cf. Rawls v. Carlisle & Baston,
118 Ala. App. 644, 93 So. 818, rev'd on other grounds, 208 Ala. 164, 93 So. 820
(1922).
74. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-23 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 442(a)
(1968).
75. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-21011(26) (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-
3002(b) (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 432(b) (1968).
76. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
77. Miller Nationwide Real Estate Corp. v. Sikeston Motel Corp., 418 S.W.2d
173 (Mo. 1967).
78. Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 4735.21 (Baldwin 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 446 (1968).
79. See note 75 and accompanying text supra; Williams v. Kinsey, 74 Cal. App.
2d 583, 169 P.2d 487 (1946); Tongue v. White, 47 Misc. 2d 357, 262 N.Y.S.2d 570
(Broome County Ct. 1965). In Tongue the decedent was a licensed salesman em-
ployed by defendant, a licensed broker. The decedent worked under a contract in
which he split commissions with the broker. Before his death the decedent arranged
a lease from which he was to receive ten percent of the rents collected by the broker.
The widow brought an action to recover commissions that had not become due until
after her husband's death. The broker defended by claiming that under the statute
he was prohibited from paying a commission to an unlicensed person. Recovery by
the widow was allowed because the decedent-salesman had earned the commissions
before his death; his widow could be paid without violation of the statute. See OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-312(14) (Supp. 1975) (punishable by suspension or revoca-
man's receipt of compensation from anyone but his licensed broker-
employer."0
A licensed broker employing an unlicensed salesman cannot re-
cover a commission for transactions on which the salesman worked.81
Courts deem this rule necessary to effectuate the licensing require-
ments for salesmen. 2 Mere employment of an unlicensed salesman,
however, does not prevent a broker's collecting for work not per-
formed by the salesman. 3 Plaintiff in Hahn v. Hauptman,"4 was a
licensed broker who employed an unlicensed salesman. Plaintiff-
broker was given an exclusive listing for a three-day period, the
commission to be earned if negotiations during that time resulted in a
purchase within thirty days. Because the unlicensed salesman
handled the negotiations, the broker was denied recovery. During
the thirty-day period the salesman had obtained a license, but since he
was unlicensed during performance, this was of no consequence. 5
A salesman who simply introduces the parties and takes no part
in the negotiations can recover a commission. In this situation, the
court will view the salesman as a mere finder, excused from the
licensing requirement.8 "
One who merely introduces two parties to a real estate trans-
action, whether or not he solicits those persons, does not need
to be as knowledgeable about real estate transactions as a
licensed broker, unless, of course, he participates in the negotia-
tions .... Unless he enters into the negotiations of the trans-
action or other activities beyond introduction, he need not be
well versed in real estate law or in real estate economics and
appraising.8
7
The rules barring a licensed broker from recovery if his sales-
tion of broker's license); id. § 858-401 (punishable as a misdemeanor); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 445 (1968) (punishable by suspension or revocation).
80. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra.
81. Willner v. Wilder, 280 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973); Glaser v. Shostack,
213 Md. 383, 131 A.2d 724 (1957).
82. Hahn v. Hauptman, 107 Cal. App. 739, 291 P. 418 (1930); Meyers v. Suf-
fin, 203 N.Y.S. 103 (1st Dep't. 1924).
83. C.B. Snyder Realty Co. v. Sherrill-Noonan, Inc., 261 F.2d 269 (3d Cir.
1958).
84. 107 Cal. App. 739, 291 P. 418 (1930).
85. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
87. Tyrone v. Kelley, 9 Cal. 3d 1, 11, 507 P.2d 65, 72, 106 Cal. Rptr. 761,
768 (1973). See also C.B. Snyder Realty Co. v. Sherrill-Noonan, Inc., 261 F.2d 269
(3d Cir. 1958); Young v. Kidder, 33 N.M. 654, 275 P. 98 (1929). In Lerman v.
Friedmann, 43 Pa. D. & C. 343 (C.P. Phila. 1941), a licensed broker employed plain-
tiff, whom be knew to be unlicensed, as a salesman to solicit potential clients in ex-
change for a commission. Plaintiff-salesman procured a client, but the broker re-
fused to pay him. The court held for the broker.
The fact that defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff was unli-
censed at the time of the execution of the contract and the performance of
services thereunder, is not sufficient to preclude him from asserting this




man is unlicensed"' and barring an unlicensed salesman from recov-
ering from a broker" are unduly harsh. Consider the registration
requirements for architects. Many states allow a registered architect to
employ an unregistered graduate architect to aid in design as long as
the final plans bear a stamp of approval from the registered archi-
tect.90 The public danger arising from poorly designed buildings is
surely greater than that presented by unlicensed real estate salesmen.
If a registered supervisor's approval sufficiently protects the public
from the unregistered architect, the same principle should operate to
benefit the unlicensed real estate salesman whose work is approved by
a licensed broker. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the li-
censed broker is within the class intended to be protected by the
licensing requirements for salesmen. A settled principle of torts law
states that one who injures another in the course of violating a statute
is not per se liable unless his victim was within the intended benefi-
ciary class. 9 ' That principle is applicable here. When two people
deal with each other and both are engaged in professions that require
licensure for the benefit of their customers, it denies justice to allow
one to defeat the claims of the other because the latter was unli-
censed.92 The policy of protecting the public is advanced not in the
least by allowing a licensed broker to avoid a contractual obliga-
tion to an unlicensed salesman on so flimsy a theory.93
IV. Conflicts of Laws: Brokers Selling Land in Other States
Sellers of real estate sometimes attempt to avoid paying a com-
mission by showing that the broker, although licensed in another
state, was unlicensed in the forum. 94 Hopeless confusion characteriz-
es this area,95 which is governed generally by the conflicts of law rules
88. See notes 81-85 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra. Another example of harsh-
ness is the rule barring a licensed broker from recovery if he enters a fee-split-
ting arrangement with an unlicensed broker. See notes 136-57 and accompanying
text infra.
90. E.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-1-35 (1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 30
(1968); Wis. STAT. § 443.01(1)(f) (1974).
91. Akers v. Chicago St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 58 Minn. 540, 60 N.W. 669 (1894).
92. Cf. Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, Inc., 55 Cal. 2d 162, 356 P.2d 203, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 459 (1960).
93. Donadt v. Eberle, 20 N.J. Misc. 349, 27 A.2d 612 (Dist. Ct. Hudson
County 1942). But cf. Gilbert v. Edwards, 276 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
94. Ehrenzweig, The Real Estate Broker and the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM.
L. REV. 303 (1959); Annot., 159 A.L.R. 266 (1945).
95. 2 J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT op LAws 1077 (1935) states that "no topic of
applicable to contracts. Whether a contract's validity is to be deter-
mined by the laws of the formation state or of the performance state
has long 'been a matter of dispute.98 As a general rule, however, a
brokerage contract is a contract for the rendition of services and its
validity is determined by the law of the state in which the contract
was made unless from the contract it appears that the services are to
be performed elsewhere.9 7 In that event, the law of the performance
state governs irrespective of the property's location. 8
The place where a contract is made is the place where the last
act giving the contract binding effect occurred.9 9 The determinative
act depends upon whether the contract is unilateral or bilateral."' 0
An open listing'' gives rise to a unilateral contract with no obliga-
tion on the broker to procure a purchaser and no duty on the seller to
pay a commission until the broker produces a ready, able, and willing
purchaser.10 2  Contract formation takes place only when a buyer is
produced.'0 8 An exclusive listing, on the other hand, bilateralizes
the contract. 04 It binds the seller to keep his property on the market
the Conflict of Laws is more confused than that which deals with the law applying
to the validity of contracts." H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
321 (3d ed. 1949) states,
The question of what law determines the validity of a contract .. . is the
most confused subject in the field of Conflict of Laws. Not only do the
rules vary in the different jurisdictions, but decisions in the same court
often enunciate inconsistent theories upon the subject.
96. 2 J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1086, 1090 (1935); H. GOODRICH,
HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 321 (3d ed. 1949); E. STIMSON, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 114 (1963). A third rule, the "choice of law" rule, has not arisen in real
estate broker transactions.
97. Chrysler Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 328 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Mich.
1971); Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878); Bostrom v. Jennings, 326 Mich. 146,
40 N.W.2d 97 (1949).
98. "Where the place of contracting and of performance are the same the law
of that place will be applied." C.B. Snyder Realty Co. v. Sherrill-Noonan, Inc., 261
F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1958). See also Paulson v. Shapiro, 490 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.
1973); James v. Hiller, 85 Ariz. 40, 330 P.2d 999 (1958); Pratt v. Sloan, 41 Ga.
178, 152 S.E. 275 (1930); Davis v. Jouganatos, 81 Nev. 333, 402 P.2d 985 (1965);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 196 (1971); cf. Bundy v. Commer-
cial Credit Corp., 200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E. 860 (1931), in which it was held that the
law the contracting parties intend to govern is the law of the place where the contract
was made unless its performance is to take place elsewhere, in which event the law
of the place of performance is intended to govern.
99. Paulson v. Shapiro, 490 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1973); 2 J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 1091 (1935); 1 S. WILLISTON, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS 356 (3d ed. 1957).
100. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 24 (1970).
101. See generally Baumgartner v. Meek, 126 Cal. App. 2d 505, 272 P.2d 552
(1954); John Whiteman & Co. v. Fidei, 176 Pa. Super. 142, 106 A.2d 644 (1954).
102. "Able" means financially able. Paulson v. Shapiro, 490 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.
1973); Baumgartner v. Meek, 126 Cal. App. 2d 505, 272 P.2d 552 (1954); Ellsworth
Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967); cf. Trent Trust Co. v.
MacFarlane, 21 Hawaii 435 (1913); Thomas Reap Realty Co. v. Hadlock, 88 Ohio
L. Abs. 100, 181 N.E.2d 732 (1961).
103. Marx v. Lining, 231 Ala. 445, 165 So. 207 (1935); Watts v. Barber, 275
Ky. 411, 121 S.W.2d 59 (1938); Hampton Park Corp. v. T.D. Burgess Co., 270 Md.
269, 311 A.2d 35 (1973); Vreeland v. Vetterlein, 33 N.J.L. 247 (1869); Keys v.
Johnson, 68 Pa. 42 (1871); Dobson v. Wolff, 74 S.D. 493, 54 N.W.2d 469 (1952).
104. An exclusive listing deprives the owner of his right to deal through other
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in exchange for the broker's promise to use due diligence in procuring
a purchaser. 10 5  Contract formation occurs when an agreement be-
tween the broker and seller is reached. 10 6
Place of performance, if different from the place of contract
formation, usually determines applicable law, although this state-
ment's logic cannot be easily explained. To begin, the general rule
that an employment contract between a seller and an unlicensed
broker is illegal 07 has been modified significantly. Most jurisdic-
tions bar real estate brokers from instituting actions for commissions
without alleging that they were licensed when their cause of action
arose.'0 8  In these jurisdictions the relationship between seller and
broker does not become illegal until a commission is actually owing-
the time the cause of action arises. 10 9 Clearly, this can be determined
only by reference to the time of performance and not by the time of
contract formation. The general rule also has been modified by
holdings that allow a broker, unlicensed when the employment con-
tract was made, to recover if he was licensed when his cause of action
arose.110 Again, the broker's status at the time of contracting is
immaterial."' The contract will not be declared illegal until perfor-
mance is rendered. Thus, if the broker has become licensed in the
interval between contract formation and the beginning of perform-
ance, courts will view the contract as legal and allow the broker's
recovery.' 
1 2
brokers. An exclusive right to sell prevents the owner himself from selling. Baum-
gartner v. Meek, 126 Cal. App. 2d 505, 272 P.2d 552 (1954); cf. Woolley v. Bishop,
180 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1950). There may be statute of frauds requirements for
exclusive listing and exclusive right to sell contracts. E.g., Led-Mil of Nev., Inc. v.
Skyland Realty & Ins., Inc., 90 Nev. 72, 518 P.2d 606 (1974); Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc.
v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967); Dooley v. Lachut, 103 R.I. 21, 234
A.2d 366 (1967). Contra, Salahuddin v. Benjamin, 42 App. Div. 2d 522, 344 N.Y.S.
2d 368 (1973).
105. Baumgartner v. Meek, 126 Cal. App. 2d 505, 272 P.2d 552 (1954); In re
Stoddard's Estate, 60 Wash. 2d 263, 373 P.2d 116 (1962). But cf. 2 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 449 (1958), which states that such a promise is not consid-
eration without other facts.
106. In the case of acceptance by mail or telegraph, the acceptance is effective
when and where it is mailed or received for transmission by the telegraph company.
If the acceptance is communicated by telephone, it is effective where the words of
acceptance are spoken. Linn v. Employers Reins. Corp., 392 Pa. 58, 139 A.2d 638
(1958).
107. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
108. See notes 58, 65 and accompanying text supra.
109. Id.
110. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
111. Id.
112. Id.
Different consequences would result if state statutes made for-
mation of the employment contract illegal, rather than its perform-
ance. In that event, no legal contract to enforce anywhere at any
time would exist. The place and time of contract formation would be
determinative. Since the place of contract formation is generally
unimportant, however, the place of performance rule has emerged as
the majority position. 1' Burns v. Gartzman,14 a particularly illus-
trative case, concerned property located in Pennsylvania and owned
by a Pennsylvania resident. An employment contract to sell a bakery
and negotiate a lease was made in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff-broker
who was licensed only in New York, sought and procured purchasers
from that state. A Pennsylvania court denied the broker recovery
because his participation in negotiations in Pennsylvania fell within
the prohibitions of the Pennsylvania statute.,15
Professor Ehrenzweig, a leading authority on the conflict of
laws, 116 has concluded that a real estate broker not locally licensed
will not be allowed to recover for the sale of forum land even if the
contract was made and performed in another state that would allow
recovery. 117 This situation would have arisen in Burns, for example,
if the broker had never entered Pennsylvania."18  This view cannot
withstand close analysis. The forum state should follow the law of
the jurisdiction in which the operative acts took place because only
that jurisdiction had sufficient contacts with the transaction." 9
The proper view was employed by the Fifth Circuit in Richland
Development Co. v. Staples."10 The facts were similar to those in
Burns except that the foreign broker never entered the forum state.
The court noted that Professor Ehrenzweig's view has scant support
in case law and that the cases he relied upon were readily distinguish-
able."' One such case, Tanenbaum v. Sylvan Builders,"22 con-
cerned negotiations in the forum state in which the broker was
unlicensed. According to the Staples rationale these facts would
113. Cf. Scudder v. Union Nat'l Bank, 91 U.S. 406 (1875); Auten v. Auten,
308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 455 (1958); id., 50
A.L.R.2d 246 (1956).
114. 139 Pa. Super. 453, 11 A.2d 708 (1940).
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2)(c) (1971).
116. Ehrenzweig, The Real Estate Broker and the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM.
L. REV. 303 (1959).
117. A state can refuse to enforce a contract valid in another state if it contra-
venes the policy of the forum. Richland Devel. Co. v. Staples, 295 F.2d 122 (5th
Cir. 1961).
118. In that case Pennsylvania would have had no theoretical justification for
applying Pennsylvania law and would have had to apply New York law under the
full faith and credit clause. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
119. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
120. 295 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1961).
121. Id. at 125 n.2.
122. 29 N.J. 63, 148 A.2d 175 (1959).
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invoke the forum's policy of protecting its citizens from unethical
practices of unregulated brokers and provide sufficient contact with
the forum state to justify application of its licensing act. 123  Another
leading case on point is C.B. Snyder Realty Co. v. Sherrill Noonan,
Inc. 2 4  A Pennsylvania corporation desiring to sell real estate in
Virginia contracted in New York with a New York broker to procure
New York buyers. A Pennsylvania court allowed recovery. The
statute prohibiting a broker unlicensed at the time the cause of action
arose from bringing an action in Pennsylvania 2 ' was held to be
procedural because it affected the availability of a remedy. Proce-
dural matters are governed by the law of the forum.' 26  The court
then held that since the licensing act only prohibited unlicensed
brokers from working in Pennsylvania, a broker performing solely in
New York was outside its scope and did not have to plead Pennsyl-
vania licensure.1
27
Constitutional issues arising under the full faith and credit
clause 28 can complicate these cases. Sun Sales Corp. v. Block Land,
Inc.'29 dealt with Pennsylvania residents selling Pennsylvania land
through a New York broker. The contract was made in New York
and performed entirely outside Pennsylvania. The court allowed
recovery, commenting that
[c]onditioning the enforcement of New York-created rights on
registering in Pennsylvania where no valid Pennsylvania policy
was at stake would be to run counter to the Supreme Court's
admonition in Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 . . . (1951),
that the states must give maximum enforcement to each other's
rights. To do otherwise would be to violate the full faith and
credit due another state's laws under Art. IV, Section 1 of the
Constitution.
13 0
This may be a first step toward realization that if no negotiations in
violation of the forum's licensing act take place in the forum, no
conflict exists because no policy of the forum is at stake. Until this
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
124. 261 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1958).
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 446 (1968).
126. Scudder v. Union Nat'l Bank, 91 U.S. 406 (1875); Sampson v. Channell,
110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940).
127. Paulson v. Shapiro, 490 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1973) (Wisconsin law). In
Greenburg v. Lusse, 12 Bucks 7 (Pa. C.P. 1961), the court said that the statute would
apply if any significant part or material incident of the transaction involving the un-
licensed broker took place in Pennsylvania. See also Paulson v. Shapiro, 490 F.2d
1 (7th Cir. 1973); Richland Devel. Co. v. Staples, 295 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1961).
128. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1971).
129. 456 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1972).
130. Id. at 863.
view is adopted and uniformity achieved, however, serious theoretical
problems will remain. For example, under the place of performance
rule applicable law is uncertain if performance occurs in several
jurisdictions. Professor Beale argued that this rule enables contract
parties to substitute the law of the performance state for the law
under which they acted in making the contract; thus they perform the
legislative function of conferring legal effect upon their acts contrary
to the express intent of the state legislatures.' Beale advocated
instead the place of making rule, 32 but that rule, as already pointed
out, has serious defects.' 33 Another illustration of the weakness of
Beale's proposal is when the place the parties entered into the contract
was merely fortuitous, such as on an in-flight airplane. Certainly
these parties would not be contracting with reference to the laws of
that jurisdiction.'34
The jurisdiction in which a broker performed his duties is the
only jurisdiction with sufficient contacts with the transaction. The
law of that jurisdiction should control. If the broker performed in a
jurisdiction in which he was unlicensed, he should be barred from
recovery in that state and in every other state. This approach will
lead to the uniformity of result that is the ultimate aim of conflicts of
law rules. 3 5
V. Unlicensed Brokers and Fee Splitting
Brokers frequently enter fee-splitting agreements with other bro-
kers.' A broker with an exclusive listing may be too busy to search
for a buyer himself or may want to expand to areas where he has no
offices or salesmen. These measures are perfectly legal, provided that
all parties to the arrangement are licensed brokers and that no fiduci-
ary duties are violated.'3 7 When an employment contract splits a com-
131. 2 J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 332.2 (1935).
132. E.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922). See
generally E. STIMSON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 91-95 (1963) for an in-depth criticism of
the place of performance rule.
133. Id.; see notes 100-13 and accompanying text supra.
134. Stimson advocated employing the law where the party under the obligation
to perform is when the contract was made. No real estate broker case has adopted
this position and it is difficult to comprehend how it could be applied to a bilateral
contract in which both parties have duties to perform. E. STIMSON, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 114-19 (1963).
135. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 590-91 (1953).
136. The obvious rationale is economic; the more people working for him in the
field, the more sales he can make. There are no statute of frauds requirements for
these contracts. J.A. Canton & Ass'n v. Devore, 281 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Ct. App.
1973). A broker employed on a fixed commission cannot engage another broker and
require the principal to pay two commissions. Mooers v. Shoemaker, 279 F. 1008
(D.C. Cir. 1922).
137. For example, Canon v. Chapman, 161 F. Supp. 104, 111 (W.D. Okla.
1958), stated,
Brokers representing the opposing sides to a negotiation who secretly
agree without the knowledge or sanction of their principals to pool their
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mission with an unlicensed brokers, however, the licensed broker will
not be allowed to recover his share since the action necessarily reveals
the statutorily forbidden participation of an unlicensed broker.13
When two or more persons undertake an obligation, it is presumed
to be a joint obligation or right.'39 The unlicensed status of one
broker, thus, is imputed to the other. A New York lower court case,
Brandenburger & Mark, Inc. v. Heimberg,4 ° stated that to hold
otherwise would allow unlicensed brokers to circumvent the law and
practice real estate brokerage by cooperating with licensed brokers.
That this rule is not ironclad, however, is illustrated by Holland v.
Morgan & Peacock Properties Co., 4' in which a licensed broker
was allowed to recover because his unlicensed cobroker falsely
claimed to be licensed. The court found a justifiable ignorance of
the facts and recognized an exception to the rule barring recovery
when a contract is tainted with illegality.'
4 2
It is doubtful that an unlicensed broker in a fee-splitting contract
can sue successfully to recover his share of a commission from a
licensed broker once the principal has paid. In Donadt v. Eberle,143
a New Jersey case, a licensed broker and an unlicensed broker agreed
to share the commission on a transaction. The licensed broker gave
his unlicensed colleague a promissory note for his share. An action
brought on the note failed because the unlicensed broker's claim was
based on his illegal conduct.14
4
A minority of states has given statutory force to these holdings
by prohibiting a licensed broker from compensating anyone but li-
respective commissions and divide them according to a prearranged plan
are not entitled to be compensated by their employers and the agreement
between themselves is void and unenforceable as being contrary to public
policy.
Accord, State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 9 A.2d 63 (1939).
Article 13 of the CODE OF ETmncs OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCATION OF REALTORS
(Rev. ed., May 1974) declares, "Since the realtor is representing one or another party
to a transaction, he should not accept compensation from more than one party with-
out the full knowledge of all of the parties to the transaction."
138. Thorpe v. Carte, 252 Md. 523, 250 A.2d 618 (1969); In re Prieto's Estate,
243 Cal. App. 2d 79, 52 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1966).
139. The fee-splitting contract is a joint contract creating joint interests and in-
terdependent rights. Cf. Douglas v. Berhere, 94 Cal. App. 2d 267, 210 P.2d 727
(1949); Lorimer v. Goff, 216 Mich. 587, 185 N.W. 791 (1921).
140. 34 N.Y.S.2d 935 (Bklyn. Mun. Ct. 1942).
141. 168 Cal. App. 2d 206, 335 P.2d 769 (1959).
142. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. In view of the vigor with which
courts enforce bans on unlicensed brokers, justifiable ignorance of the unlicensed sta-
tus of a cobroker might be difficult to prove.
143. 20 N.J. Misc. 349, 27 A.2d 612 (Dist. Ct. Hudson 1942).
144. Rosenthal v. Art Metal, Inc., 95 N.J. Super. 8, 229 A.2d 676 (1967), a!f'd,
censed brokers or salesmen for performance of any acts limited to
these licensees.'45 The contract to split commissions is made illegal.
The unlicensed broker, thus, loses on two counts: he cannot recover
from the principal because his own conduct was illegal and he cannot
recover from his cobroker because the contract between them was
illegal. New York courts have stated that this statute was intended to
strengthen the policy of preventing unlicensed persons from acting as
real estate brokers by making it impossible for them to use the name
of a licensed broker to earn a commission. 146 At least one state,
Texas, even requires that a broker party to a fee-splitting contract
plead and prove licensure in an action for commissions brought
against a cobroker. 14'
Licensed brokers in fee-splitting arrangements should not be
penalized by licensing acts that were passed to protect the public. 4 '
For the same reasons that a broker should be able to recover his
commission when his salesman is unlicensed, 49 he should be allowed
to recovery when his cobroker is unlicensed. 150
Some courts will not permit a licensed broker to defeat the claim
of an unlicensed, independent broker by showing his lack of licen-
sure. In Marx v. Lining 5' Stevens owned property he wished to sell.
Marx and Lining were independent brokers; Lining was unlicensed.
Lining notified Stevens of a prospective customer and a sale was
made. Marx then claimed to have been the procuring cause of the
sale and further argued that because Lining was unlicensed, he could
not be paid a commission. Stevens filed an interpleader to determine
which broker was entitled to the commission. The court found that
Lining had been the procuring cause of the sale and allowed him to
101 N.J. Super. 156, 243 A.2d 828 (1968); Radcliff v. Cobb, 439 P.2d 194 (Okla.
1968).
145. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 445(a) (1968), which makes such behavior
punishable by suspension or revocation of the broker's license. But see IOWA CODE
§ 117.1 (Supp. 1974).
146. Vin Clair v. Kall & Kall, Inc., 23 Misc. 2d 568, 196 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Dist.
Ct. Nassau 1960). See also Williams v. Kinsey, 74 Cal. App. 2d 583, 169 P.2d 487
(2d Dist. 1946); Thorpe v. Carte, 252 Md. 523, 250 A.2d 618 (1969).
147. Meadows v. Hughes, 318 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
148. See notes 91-93 and accompanying text supra.
149. Id.
150. Id.; cf. Bentley v. Gilmore, 285 Pa. 199, 131 A. 700 (1926).
An interesting case from the District of Columbia is Harrison v. J.H. Marshall
& Assoc., 271 A.2d 404 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970), in which a licensed broker assigned
to a collection agency his right to collect rents with the agency to receive a percent-
age of what it collected. Under D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1401 (1973) it is unlawful
to act as a real estate broker without a license and included within the scope of act-
ing as a real estate broker is collecting rent from the use of real estate. The court
held that the collection agency's actions made it a real estate broker acting in viola-
tion of the license requirement and, therefore, it could not recover its share from the
broker.
151. 231 Ala. 445, 165 So. 207 (1935).
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recover because Marx, not being a party to the contract between
Stevens and Lining, could not plead its illegality.
152
Attorneys generally are exempted from brokers' licensing re-
quirements when they deal in real estate for clients.1 53 If they enter a
fee-splitting contract with a broker, however, they may be acting
outside their capacity as attorneys and be denied a commission." In
Burchfield v. Markham'15 a Texas court held that even though an
attorney was allowed to perform broker's services, a real estate broker
was prohibited from splitting a commission with anyone but licensed
brokers or salesmen and, therefore, could not split a fee with an
attorney not possessing a broker's license.' 5 6
Why the statutes are written and interpreted to deny recovery to
an attorney who has agreed to work with a broker in exchange for a
share of the commission is beyond comprehension. If an attorney
can perform broker's services while acting alone for a client, he
should be able to act with a broker as a part of a fee-splitting
arrangement. The licensing requirement as applied to attorneys in
fee-splitting cases appears to be a revenue-raising measure. There-
fore, recovery should be allowed despite violation of the statute. 157
VI. The Business Broker: Sales of Personal and Real Property
A Wisconsin statute defines a "business opportunity broker" as
one who
[f]or another'"8 and for a commission, money or other thing of
value,' 59 sells, exchanges, buys or rents, or offers or attempts
152. [Clontracts which are void, not because they are immoral or evil in
themselves, but because they are offensive to the policy of the state which
the statute established may, in some instances, be enforced even in courts of
law, because of the inability of the party affected to plead their invalidity.
id. at 449, 165 So. at 210; Miller Nationwide Real Estate Corp. v. Sikeston Motel
Corp., 418 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1967).
153. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 311(3)(b)(2) (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 432(c) (1968). In Young v. Department of Pub. Instr., 105 Pa. Super.
153, 160 A. 151 (1932), the court pointed out that the Pennsylvania statute was
passed to exclude from the profession dishonest and incompetent brokers. Attorneys
and justices of the peace were said to be subject to regulation and not a cause of
the mischief the statute was intended to prevent.
The power of attorney exception to the license requirement in Pennsylvania is
discussed in Kusche v. Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co., 416 Pa. 364, 206 A.2d 40
(1965).
154. Frieman v. Greaves, 80 Ohio App. 341, 74 N.E.2d 860 (1947).
155. 156 Tex. 329, 294 S.W.2d 795 (1956).
156. Haas v. Greenwald, 196 Cal. 236, 237 P. 38 (1925); Frieman v. Greaves,
80 Ohio App. 341, 74 N.E.2d 860 (1947).
157. See note 2 supra.
158. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
159. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
to negotiate a sale, exchange, purchase or rental of any business,
its good will, inventory, fixtures or an interest therein .... 160
The statute requires business opportunity brokers to obtain the same
license as real estate brokers. 61 Failure to do so subjects business
brokers to the same penalties.' 62 Most states, however, do not have
specific provisions for business brokers. Because the sale of a busi-
ness ordinarily covers both real and personal property, in addition to
intangible items such as good will, difficulties often arise. Someone
who does not think of himself as a real estate broker may find himself
suing to recover commissions from a defendant who claims that the
real estate broker licensing act was violated. These uncertainties
have led to substantial litigation, from which two approaches have
crystallized. 163
Courts that have adopted the majority approach6 of Kenney v.
Paterson Milk & Cream Co.' 65 allow an unlicensed broker who has
sold a business to recover for only those parts of the -transaction that
are not within the statutory prohibition against unlicensed real estate
sales, provided the legal portion of the sale is severable from the
illegal.' 66 If the sales contract authorizes only a lump sum payment,
however, the entire commission will be lost. 67  In Kenney, for
example, the unlicensed plaintiff negotiated the sale of a dairy's real
and personal property. Recovery was denied because the considera-
tion was entire and incapable of severance. Marks v. Walter G.
McCarty Corp.168 held that when real and personal property of a
hotel were given separate prices in the escrow instructions for tax
purposes, the person who arranged the sale could recover a commis-
sion for the personal property. Between the parties to the sale the
consideration was indivisible; without the real property the personal
property was worthless. Between the seller and the broker, however,
recovery depended not upon whether the real and personal property
could have been sold separately, but on whether the price of the
personal property could be ascertained. 169
160. WIS. STAT. § 452.01(d) (1974) (footnotes added).
161. Id. § 452.03; see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10130 (West Supp. 1974).
162. Cf. George Nangen & Co. v. Kenosha Auto Transp. Corp., 238 F. Supp.
157 (E.D. Wis. 1965).
163. See generally Annots., 167 A.L.R. 774 (1947); 88 A.L.R. 1422 (1934);
56 A.L.R. 453 (1928).
164. Cf. Abrams v. Guston, I10 Cal. App. 2d 556, 243 P.2d 109 (1952); Gram-
mer ,,. Skagit Valley Lumber Co., 162 Wash. 677, 299 P. 376 (1931); Annot., 88
A.L.R. 1422 (1934).
165. 110 N.J.L. 141, 164 A. 274 (1933).
166. See generally Jacobs v. Clark, 112 Vt. 484, 28 A.2d 369 (1942).
167. In re Craig's Estate, 298 Pa. 235, 148 A. 83 (1929); Osgood v. Central
Vt. R.R., 77 Vt. 334, 60 A. 137 (1905); Lund v. Bruflat, 159 Wash. 89, 292 P. 112
(1930).
168. 33 Cal. 2d 814, 205 P.2d 1025 (1949).




New York has adopted a different approach. In Weingast v.
Rialto Pastry Shop 7° plaintiff-broker claimed that his occupation was
selling restaurants as going concerns, not selling real estate. The
owners of a restaurant he sold, nevertheless, refused to pay his
commission because he was unlicensed as a real estate broker. Plain-
tiff argued that he had sold the business' good will and that the
property, both real and personal, was merely incidental to the transac-
tion. A six-to-one majority, which included Judges Cardozo and
Andrews, held that a real estate broker's license was not required.
Because the statute making it a crime to act as a real estate broker
without a license' 7 ' was penal in nature, it was to be strictly construed
and not extended judicially to include business brokers. 72  Recent
New York decisions have upheld Weingast and formulated a test to
distinguish business brokerage from real estate brokerage.
73
[I]f an item of real estate, or an interest in real estate, is a mere
incident or incidental feature of the -transaction obviously the
statute does not apply ....
[ . . T]his may be true even though such an item may be
significant though not a dominant feature of the transaction.
174
Thus, while the majority approach strips the business broker of his
commission unless the real and personal property values are severa-
ble, the New York approaoh requires a real estate broker's license
only if the essence of the transaction is a sale of real estate.'
7 5
The weakness of the majority approach is illustrated by Schultz
(8th Cir. 1969) (architect). Pennsylvania has adopted this approach. Schoenfeld
v. Meckes, 57 Pa. D. & C. 531 (Mun. Ct. Phila. 1947) (recovery denied because con-
sideration was entire). Plaintiff-broker had sought a commission for only that part
of the transaction that was not illegal. The court rejected his claim, declaring that
to hold otherwise would nullify the statute and run counter to the legislature's inten-
tion. The court further held that plaintiff would not be allowed to violate the statute,
voluntarily abandon a portion of his claim, and by such a simple expedient legalize
an illegal transaction. See also Schoettle v. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 768
(E.D. Pa. 1961); Moreland v. Kilgore, 83 Ga. App. 606, 64 S.E.2d 295 (1951); Di-
vito v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 174 Ohio St. 301, 189 N.E.2d 57 (1963).
170. 243 N.Y. 113, 152 N.E. 693 (1926).
171. In 1959 the New York Legislature enacted N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 443
(McKinney 1968) requiring business brokers to be registered, not licensed, with the
Department of State, but Weingast has remained law. See, e.g., Myer v. Jova Brick
Works, Inc., 33 App. Div. 2d 615, 326 N.Y.S.2d 321 (3d Dep't 1971).
172. Accord, Clagget v. American Bowling & Billiard Corp., 48 N.Y.S.2d 856
(Sup. Ct. 1944); cf. Pike v. Psihogios, 68 Cal. App. 145, 228 P. 722 (1924).
173. E.g., Dodge v. Richmond, 5 App. Div. 2d 593, 173 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1st Dep't
1958).
174. Id. at 595, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
175. Id. While it is still a minority position, a few states have adopted the New
York approach. A Mississippi case, Quick Shops of Miss., Inc. v. Bruce, 232
521,
v. Palmer Wellcot Tool Corp.176  An unlicensed broker negotiated
the sale of a manufacturing plant. The value of the real property was
only $9,000 of a total value of $335,000. Because the consideration
was not made divisible, however, the broker lost his commission.
The federal court hearing the case was obviously distressed by the
forfeiture of a $20,000 commission because of a judicially created
technicality. Although state law forced the court to deny recovery,
Judge Goodrich, speaking for a unanimous three-judge panel, stated,
We concede that there is good argument to be made for the
New York view in not applying this statute to the situation
where a going business has been sold and the real estate part of
it is purely incidental. But that is not a choice that we are at
liberty to make.
177
The decisions adopting the majority approach evidence a serious
misunderstanding of the law. The licensing acts were enacted to
protect a naive public from sharp practices of brokers.1 78  They were
not enacted to protect businessmen. Even more than in the private
home market, potential forfeitures of business brokers' commissions
are so staggering and so disproportionate to the offense that the spirit
of the law, if not its letter, is offended.
So. 2d 351 (Miss. 1970), concerned the sale of a going business by a real estate
broker licensed in another state. Included in the sale was a nonrenewable lease. The
court discussed the possible ways of dealing with the case and decided that real estate
was not a sufficiently dominant part of the transaction to deprive the broker of his
commission. The case is distinguishable from Weingast because the Mississippi stat-
ute does not include dealings with leases within its definition of real estate broker.
Also, because leases were personal property at common law, the court may have de-
termined not to extend the statute. The authority relied upon, however, was Wein-
gast. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-35-3 (1972). Cary v. Borden Co., 153 Coo. 354,
386 P.2d 585 (1963), reached a similar result under a similar statute.
In a Maryland case, Glaser v. Shostack, 213 Md. 383, 131 A.2d 724 (1957),
a licensed broker employed an unlicensed salesman. This alleged illegality was
pleaded as a defense when the broker brought an action for a commission on the
sale of a tavern. The broker argued that the real estate was only an incidental part
of the transaction, which was primarily concerned with goods, fixtures, equipment,
and a liquor inventory. The court allowed recovery, citing Weingast as authority and
even using similar language. "We think the provisions of the subtitle 'Real Estate
Broker' do not include the activities of one who has sold a business .... ." Id. at
388, 131 A.2d at 726. In Ingalls v. Neufeld, 487 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972),
the court did not even contemplate denying recovery.
Of course, if the transaction, in fact, does not include realty, the licensing re-
quirement is not applicable. In Ireland v. Tomahawk Light, Tel. & Improv. Co., 185
Wis. 148, 200 N.W. 642 (1924), an unlicensed broker negotiated the sale of a public
utility. The court allowed recovery, holding that a public utility is personal property
because the plant and real estate are merely incidental to the franchise into which
they merge to form a single entity. Hughes v. Chapman, 272 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.
1959) (sale of radio station and facilities; recovery allowed because F.C.C. certificate
was essence of transaction); Frier v. Terry, 323 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1959) (sales of
stock in realty; recovery allowed); Marble v. Clein, 55 Wash. 2d 315, 347 P.2d 830
(1959) (same).
176. 207 F.2d 652 (3d Cir. 1953).
177. Id. at 654.




Unless he can establish himself or his transaction as an exception
to the licensing requirement, the unlicensed real estate broker will be
denied his commission.' A licensed broker also can lose his com-
mission if a salesman working for him is unlicensed.180 Moreover,
that the purported broker has engaged in only one transaction will not
aid his cause."' Nor will it avail him in most jurisdictions to plead
that in a business sale only an insignificant part of the transaction
concerned real estate.' 82 Even a broker licensed in another state'
83
or one who has allowed to expire a license held for many years 8 4 or
one who can establish his competence beyond a reasonable doubt
may still be denied a commission. Furthermore, an offender also can
be jailed or fined or have his license suspended or revoked.' 85
179. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
180. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
181. See notes 35-51 and accompanying text supra.
182. See notes 158-69 and accompanying text supra.
183. See notes 94-105 and accompanying text supra.
184. See notes 56-72 and accompanying text supra.
185. Criminal penalties are contained in all the licensing acts. The Pennsyl-
vania act, which is typical, makes it a misdemeanor to
engage in or carry on the business, or act in the capacity of a real estate
broker. . . within this commonwealth without a license. . . or [to] employ
any person as a real estate salesman to whom a license as a salesman has
not been issued ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 442(a) (1968). In every case in which a broker can be
denied a commission for not being licensed, he is also liable for prosecution under
these penal provisions in addition to suspension or revocation of his license.
Punishing the broker in both the civil and criminal courts seems too severe. In
Manker v. Tough, 79 Kan. 46, 98 P. 792 (1908), the Kansas Supreme Court attacked
forfeiture of commissions under a statute also providing for criminal penalties. A
broker had failed to comply with a municipal ordinance requiring the payment of a
license tax, but was allowed to recover his commission. The court asked,
Why should one party to a contract be allowed . . . to gain an unconscion-
able advantage because the other party deliberately, or through inability or
mere oversight, has failed to discharge an obligation to the city when there
is available . . . both a civil remedy for the wrong and a penal remedy
against the wrongdoer? . . . Is not the penalty [of forfeiture] entirely dis-
proportionate to the offense, especially as, when it has been suffered,
neither the civil nor the penal action by the city has been abated? . . . As
the law has been construed for a long time by this and most other courts
of last resort, it appears to furnish an inducement to evil-disposed persons
to watch opportunities to contract with anyone upon whom a license tax
has been imposed, at a time when, for perhaps only a day, he has neglected
to pay his tax, and thus acquire merchandise or services without paying
therefor.
Id. at 53, 98 P. at 795. The court also pointed out the injustice of allowing a seller
to penalize a broker for an omission that has brought the seller no harm. "The rule
• . . that allows one party to a civil action to penalize for his own benefit the other
party for an act which occasioned him no loss would seem to be exotic to the juris-
prudence of this state." Id. at 54, 98 P. at 795.
Injustice is a hallmark of the brokers' licensing acts. They make
it a crime for friends or relatives to assist another in a single sale of
property. They allow a fully informed industrialist to avoid contrac-
tual obligations by hiding behind a statute designed to protect small
homeowners from dishonest brokers. They can deprive a business
broker of a commission because at the last minute the terms of a real
estate lease were negotiated. They permit one broker to deprive
another of a commission they agreed to share even though the statutes
regarded brokers as the class to be protected against, not protected.
It is time to examine real estate broker licensing acts to see if
they are serving the purposes set for them, protecting the public from
incompetence and dishonesty in the real estate brokerage profession.
If the statutes have become means by which wrongs are committed,
either the goals must be restated or the statutes rewritten. Since the
goals remain laudable, the statutes must change.
LARRY I. HAFT
